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SEVENTEEN

Sartre's second or dialectical ethics
Thomas C. Anderson

When Jean-Paul Sartre died in 1980, some in the French press called
him the moral conscience of post-war France. Jn fact, in an interview he
gave towards the end of his life, Sartre himself stated that he had always
been a " moral philosopher" and also that he had attempted to write
three different ethics in his lifetime. Of course, ethics was just one of
his many interests. His exceptional talent led him to write plays, novels
and sho rt stories, works on psychology and political theory, ontology,
philosophy of history, philosophy of art and philosophical biographies.
Nevertheless, I believe that his interests in moral philosophy and moral
values were at the centre o f his life and constituted the underlying substructure (to use a Marxian term) of his life and works. One reason I say
this is because almost from the beginning his ethics was humanistic in
that be identified the goal of morality and the goal of human existence.
This chapter is primarily devoted to what Sartre himself designated
as his second "realistic" ethics, thereby contrasting it with his first "idealistic" ethics. The latter was the one be promised at the end of Being
and Nothingness and worked on for well over a decade. He eventually
came to believe that this ethics, based on the onto logical categories set
forth in that early phenomenological ontology, was too far removed
from the real world in which human beings existed. Although this
chapter focuses on his second ethics, the fact is that in the writings of
Sartre relatively few pages are devoted to it. Almost the only source we
have is 165 pages of handwritten notes that were a lecture he gave in
Rome in 1964. But even if we had more, it would still be very important
that we understand a number of the basic concepts and ontological
foundations of the first ethics in order to appreciate why he became so
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dissatisfied with it that he set it aside and attempted the second. As we
shall see, there are significant and radical differences between these two
moralities and they are rooted in the funda menta lly different ontologies
on which they a re based.

Ontological foundations
From his earliest philosophical writings, Sartre sharply divided a ll reality into just two realms. This culminated in his distinction between
being-for-itself and being-in-itself, set forth in detail in his major wo rk
of phe nomenological onto logy Being and Nothingness in 1943. Beingfor-itself, human consciousness, is described as no n-substantial and
contentless {"total emptiness"; BNl : xxxii; BN2: 12). It is no thing but
a web of a U kinds of intentional conscious acts in relation to objects. It
is "all activity, all spontaneity" (BNl : xxxv; BN2: 15), "self-determining", "self-activated", "cause of itself" and therefore, free (BN1/ BN2:
introduction). Being-in-itself, on the other hand, is described as passive
and inert. It is thoroughly identical w ith itself and filled with being. It
is nothing but a full positivity o f being, w hich contains no nonbeing
and so "does not enter into any connection with w hat is not itself". It
simply "is itself ", "glued to itself" and so " isolated in its being~·. Thus
being-for-itself and being-in-itseU are "absolutely separated regions of
being", Sartre asserts (BN1: xxxix; BN2: 19). O ne consequence of their
separation is that being-for-itself is totall y free fro m any influence of
being-in-itse lf. Human consciousness is not affected by the being it is
aware of; its relation to be ing is tota lly negative.
Sartre implies that his definitions of the characteristics of these two
regions of be ing are the result of a phenomenological analysis, that is,
are conclusions of careful reflection on and descriptions of the phenomena of consciousness and of its objects. I must confess that I consider
that very implausible. But what is even more problematic in his analysis
is that throughout Being and Nothingness he often without explanation
simply equates being-for-itself, human consciousness, with human reality itself or " man" and freedom. Accordingly, when we turn to his most
extensive treatment of freedo m and its relation to other things (part 4 ),
we find Sartre insisting not only o n the total freedom of consciousness
but also o f hu man reality! H e argues that consciousness/human reality
is free because it can always transcend what is and grasp what is not, for
example, non-existent goals or ideals. Every conscious act, he says, " is
a projectio n of the for-itself towards what is not, and what is can in no
way determine by itself what is not" (BNl: 435-6; BN2: 457). And he
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proceeds to identi fy this freedom with the freedom of human reality:
my freedom "is very exactly the stuff o f my being ... freedo m is not a
being; it is the being o f m an" (BNl : 439). H e minimizes to the point of
denial any limitations o f human freedom referring to it as "absolute",
"to tal", " infinite", and " without limits" (BNl: 435-41 , 53 0-3 1, 549).
"M an can not be sometimes slave and sometimes free", he asserts, "he is
wholly and forever free or he is not free at all" (BN1: 441 ; BN2: 463).
Such a view o f human reality and human freedom is fo r the later
Sartre, the author o f Critique of Dialect ical Reason volume 1 (1960b,
1976a), far too "abstract" and "irreal" (hjs words). It is not the real freedom of concrete human beings who are thoroughly imme rsed in and
conditioned by the natural and social worlds, which worlds inevitably
restrict them to "a strictly Jimjted field of possibilities". A majo r reason
Sartre labels his second ethics "realistic" is because it accurately recognizes the dialectical character of huma n relations to the wo rld. That
is, there is mutual interaction and causation between huma ns and the
world. This occurs because in the Critique and later works, human reality is described no t simply as a &ee consciousness (o r being-for-itselO
sepa rate fro m na ture o r the things o f the world but as a completely
material o rganism. Sartre characterizes his position in the Critique as
a " mo nism of materiality" and a "realistic materialism" (Sartre 1976a:
29, 181). What distingujshes the human o rganism fro m all o thers, he
says, is its consciousness, which, howeve r, he no lo nger d escribes as
non-substantial o r pure spontaneous self-determining activity. Rather
man is "who lly matte r ", he insists (ibid.: 180). We are mad e up of the
very same physical ato ms and molecules as any other material thing.
Like any organism the human is a synthesis of parts that is threatened by
all the things in the world which can dissolve or destroy it. Furthermore,
the organism's maintenance and growth is thoroughl y de pendent on
and dialectically conditioned by the material world and othe r material
organisms to satisfy its many needs. Indeed, it is the organism's urge
to satisfy its needs that initiates all o f its act ions on its environment.
Yet human conscio usness is still considered by Sartre to be free
because of its ability to go beyond o r transcend every situa tion. It can
in his words "negate", " deny", "wrench itself from" what is present in
a ny given situatio n towards what is not - such as a not now existing
goal o r imaginary ideal (ibid.: 70--7 1, 83-8, 97, 422, 549). As we noted,
however, human freedo m is restricted by the natural and social milieu
in which it exists, sometimes severely.
To conclude this section, let us note that since Sartre's early and his
later ontologies have such fundamentaJiy different conceptio ns of the
nature o f human reality and its relations to the world, it will not be
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surprising that Sartre's first and second moralities which are based on
these respective ontologies will themselves differ significantly. As a first
step toward grasping these differences, I tum next to consider what
each ethics takes to be the ultimate foundation of human values and
goals. After all every ethics, whatever its ontological base, is concerned
with values (BNl: 626; BN2: 646).

The nature and source of values

In Being and Nothingness Sartre states unequivocally that the human
being "is the being by whom values exist" and more precisely that "his
freedom [is] ... the unique source of values" (BNl: 62 7; BN2: 647). He
is equally clear on the devastating impact this position has on ethics. If
human freedom makes values exist, then this "paralyses" and "relatives"
ethics, for it means that no values exit objectively or apart from human
freedom. Rather, whatever one freely chooses to value, whether love
or hate, freedom or slavery, torture or kindness, will be of value. "My
freedom is the sole foundation of values", he writes, and so "nothing,
absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value,
this or that particu lar scale of values" (BNl: 38; BN2: 62). I cannot
appeal to any objective values to justify my actions for there are none
and any morality which tries to set forth objective norms of human
conduct is doomed from the start.
Sartre's argument for this position is as follows. Values are experienced as imperatives or norms. As such they are not being but are
"beyond being"; they are not something that is but something which
· should be brought into being. As imperatives and norms, values are
experienced not as something real but as requirements and demands to
be made real. Since values are beyond what is, their reality can be due
only to a being that is able to transcend what is and posit what is not.
Such a being is, of course, human reality and values are precisely that
towards which every human being surpasses what is.
As in the first ethics, Sartre in his second or dialectkal ethics considers values to be imperatives or norms or obligations that we experience
as requiring our adherence. They are not descriptions of facts but prescriptions for conduct (Sartre 1964b: 41, 65, 69, 72). In contrast to his
first ethics, however, in his dialectical ethics Sartre insists that there is
a "given", "assigned", even "imposed" (his words: ibid.: 67, 98, 145)
character to moral values and goals. That is because he now believes that
"the root of morality is in need" (ibid.: 100; see also 87-98). Needs, he
explains, are not just a lack of something, they are felt exigencies, felt
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(at least obscurely) demands to be satisfied. Because we have various
needs which demand their satisfaction, we experience certain objects
(for example, food, health, knowledge and love) to be valuable and thus
to be things we feel we should obtain. In other words, because we are
specific lcinds of organisms with specific needs, certain kinds of objects
are necessary to satisfy these needs. Since we do not freely choose the
needs we have, we cannot freely choose the kind of things that fulfil
those needs. It is not up to an individual's free cho ice, for example,
whether oxygen o r knowledge or love fulfil his or her needs and are
thereby of value for them. Thus, by making human needs rather than
human freedom the source of moral values, Sartre's second dialectical
ethics grants them a certain objectivity, that is, an independence from
human freedom - for it can neither create nor remove their value.
Oxygen and love have value for me whether I choose them to have
it or not. And, again, because they are of value I experience them as
something that should be attained.

The goal of ethics

The foregoing considerations naturally lead to a consideration of the

primary value or ultimate goal Sartre posits for each of his two moralities. In this sectio n we will also discuss the reasons (in other words,
the justification) he offers in each ethics for proposing the respective
goal he does.
The goal of Sartre's first ethics is freedom. He speaks of it as "the
reign of human freedom" (Sartre 1988: 198), which is also the dty of
ends where each person treats the other as an end. This city is identified with a socialist, classless society "where freedom is valued as such
and willed as such" (Sartre 1992: 418; 1988: 192). In one sense this is
perfectly straightforward because, as we have seen, at this time Sartre
often identified human reality with freedom. To propose freedom as
our highest value is simply to propose human existence as our highest
value. There is a serious problem with doing so, however, namely, Sartre's total subjectivism when it comes to values. If all values are human
creations why not propose that humans value power or pleasure or, for
that matter, world domination or destruction as their supreme goaV
value? Why single out freedom?
Sartre's cryptic argument in his lecture Existentialism and Humanism involves an appeal to "strict consistency" (Sartre 1973: 51), both
logical consistency and consistency with reality. Since human freedom is
the only source of value in Sartre's universe, it is logical and consistent
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with the way things are that it be chosen as one's primary value. Once I
realize that any value I confer on anything {such as my and others' lives,
socialism, pleasure) comes from my freedom, the rational thing to do
is to first and foremost value that freedom. It would be both logically
inconsistent and inconsistent with the way things are not to do so. I
must say that I believe Sartre's argument is a good one- but onl y if o ne
first chooses to confer value on logical consistency and consistency with
rea.lity. Since in his early ontology, nothing possesses any intrinsic or
objective value, there can be no logical or moral requirement for o ne
to choose to value cons.istency. That choice simply cannot be justified
without begging the question.
Even if o ne overlooks that problem, it remains very unclear what
exactly it means to choose freedom as one's highest value and goal.
Removing obstacles and limitations to freedom is one thing but what
is liberated freedom for- for more freedom - fo r who or what ? Surely
not for just an yone and anything. Sartre clearly supports the oppressed
and wretched of the earth, not their oppressors. But his justifica6 o n for
that preference remains unclear. Actually, this criticism is Sartre' s own
complaint that his first ethics was too abstract and irreaJ {idealistic).
The goal of the second, dialectical ethics is significantly more real
and richer in content. RecaJI that in this ethics Sartre maintains that all
values arise not from human freedom but from human m:c:ds. Given
this connection it is not surprising that the ultimate value and goal of
this ethics is not a vague freedom but human fulfilment, that is, the
satisfaction of human needs, also caJied "human p lenitude ... the fu lly
alive o rganism" and "integral man" (Sartre 1964b: 55, 95). Of course,
human fu 1filment does demand the attainment o f freedom, our need for
freedom is certainly one o f our most fundamental needs, but a human
organism has many other important needs. Sartre mentions o ur basic
needs for protein, for vitamjos, for life itself. H e especiaJiy emphasizes
our needs for knowledge, for culture, and for the love and val uatio n of
others, as well as for a mearungfullife (ibid.: 63, 66, 77, 81, 97-101,
132-5, 164). Because the goal of his dialectical ethics has far more content than the abstract freedom of his first ethics, it is, he suggests, able to
be more specific about the type of acts or policies that are morally desirable- namely, those which promote the fulfilment of the varied needs of
the human o rganism. Accordingly, in the second ethics Sartre states that
he is attempting to set forth not an abstract morality but one that is also
a praxis in the world, that is, a moral theory that can put forward both
the ultimate value which human beings should seek {namely, human
fulfilment) and also suggest, at least in general, what should be do ne to
our particular capitalistic social, economic and political structures t o
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achieve that end. Morality is something lived, he asserts, and at bottom
it may be that morality and politics are one and the same.
In works after the Rome lecture, especiaJly those after the French
student and worker uprisings of 1968, Sartre argues for a society without hierarchies or classes, that is, one without power concentrated in
an elite few. Instead of a ruling class, or state, he wants complete equality, a government by the people in the fullest sense. This will require
the abolition of the division of labour, which, he believes, gives rise
to narrow specialization and class distinctions. All people should have
the right to participate in the economic, social and political governance of their country through "organs of decentralized power in work
and in the entire social domain" (Sartre 1974c: 108). In the economic
sphere these organs would involve collective ownership and management of the means of production, such as, the factories, mjnes, media,
banks and other social-economic institutions. In the political sphere,
Sartre advocates direct democracy, a society where the masses unite
to express their wishes effectively. Even if a direct democracy takes a
representative form, he wants a new system in which, for example, a
representative elected by 5,000 people would be "nothing other than
5,000 persons; he must find the means for himself to be these 5,000
people" (ibid.: 307). Direct democracy would involve "popular" courts,
that is, a judiciary chosen by the people, simjJar to those that arose in
France in the late 1960s. At that time workers in factories and mines set
up people's courts and publicly staged trials of their bosses and owners
(Sartre participated in some of those courts).
Even in a direct democracy the implementation of policies may be
the task of a smaller number of experts. But those experts must always
be guided by the masses and return to them to make certain of their
support. Even though he continues to refer to his ideal as socialism
during this period, it is clearly a decentralized, debureaucratized and
democratized version. And, the major advice Sartre offers to achieve
this socialism is that one must join with the oppressed masses in their
moral fight for liberation.
FinaJly, let me point out that what Sartre wants for his dialectical
ethics, an ethics that is also a politics, would require detailed study
of the socio-economic-political structures of the society in which we
live - a gigantic task that would take the collaboration of many disciplines. That is the kind of thing he himself attempted to some degree
in his analyses of French colonialism in Algiers, the Soviet Union and
Stalinism in the twentieth century, French history in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, the French Indochina and Vietnam wars, and the
Czechoslovakian spring to mention just a few.
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We still need to address the justification Sartre offers for proposing
the fu lfilment of human needs or integral man as the ultimate value and
goaJ of his second ethics. T he answer lies in the ontological structure,
the needs, of the human organism : "Need posits man as his own e nd"
(Sartre 1964b: 100), he writes. In the Rome lecture Sartre cryptically
cites Marx who, he says, states that "need does not necessitate any justification " (ibid.: 98). The very fact that our needs demand to be satisfied
makes their satisfaction our primary value and goal. We do not need
to come up with reasons to justify seeking that goal which is required
by our needs. Indeed, we are not free to decide what our ultimate end
and primary value is. We a re organisms with needs and so our ultimate
end/value, human fulfilment, is "given", "assigned", even "imposed"
on us, Sartre states (ibid.: 97-8). We do not need, nor can we find, any
reason for valuing this goaJ other than the fact our needs require it. I
believe this is what Sartre means when he cites another statement of
Marx, " need is its own reason for its satisfaction" (ibid. : 97). It simply
does not ma ke sense to ask for reasons why we should choose human
fulfilment as our ultimate value/goal. To demand such reasons is to seek
what cannot be given, since there is no value/goal more fundamental
than human fulfilment to w hich one could appeal to justify choosing it.

Human relations
One of the most important human needs that Sartre cites - especiall y
in his last major work, The Family Idiot (Sartre 1971-2) - is for the
affection and approval of other people. His early view of human relationships, he complained, was far too negative and too individualistic.
In Being and Nothingness he minimized the power of human beings
to affect each other and stressed instead the complete responsibility of
each individual fo r his or her Life. He also looked upon other people
primarily as dangers to one's individual freedom and in confl ict or
potentially in conflict with me. "The essence of the relations between
consciousnesses", he wrote, "is conflict". He a lso insisted t hat one can
relate to another o nly as a free subject to an alienated object or vice
versa.: "one must either transcend [objectify] the other or allow oneself
to be transcended [objectified] by him" (BN1: 429; BN2: 451).
I must hasten to add, however, that his early, posthumously published
Notebooks for an Ethics (Sartre 1983b, 1992) shows clearly that Sartre
moved very quickly beyond this negative position even in his first ethics. In Notebooks, which were written in the late 1940s, he stresses the
importance of intersubjective relations of "authentic" love, friendship
and generosity and makes it clear that the conflictual relations presented
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in Being and Nothingness were never meant to be taken as the only possible human relationships. In an explicit reference to that early work
he asserts that one is able to transform the " hell" of human relations
described there (Sartre 1992: 9, 20, 499) and that human beings can
relate to each other primarily as subject to subject (ibid.: 41 8, 500).
Furthermore, as we have already pointed out, Sartre's later work, the
Critique of Dialectical Reason (and even the somewhat earlier Saint
Genet) provide ample testimony to his recognition of the dialectic in
history, in this case the tremendous impact human beings and their
social structures h ave on each other. In fact, he admits that others
through the social structures they build may Jimit the concrete freedom of many humans to almost zero- as in colonialization or slavery.
Accordingly, Sartre repeatedly urges human beings to jo in together in
groups in order to most effectively control the socio-econo mic-political
systems they c reate so that they can be directed to the fulfilment of all,
that is, the satisfaction of the needs of all
Sartre's emphasis on human interdependency is used in another work
o f his first ethics, Existentialism and Humanism, to advance an argument that the freedom we should choose as our primary value is not
just our own individual freedom but the freedom of all. " I am obliged
to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine", he states. This
is because, "In willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely on
the freedom o f others and that the freedom o f others depends o n our
own" (Sartre 1973: 51-2). In the practical order, it is obvious that both
the range of options available to our free choice as well as our freedom
to attain the goals we choose are heavily dependent on the choices
and actions of othe rs. Sartre focuses especially on the psychological
interdependency of human beings. Only humans can confer value on
my life. For me to o btain the fullest possible meaning and value for my
life, then, I need other free subjects to freely confer positive value on
me. Of course, each person can choose to value his/her life and that is
important. Still that is value from only one freedom and, Sartre suggests,
I both desire a nd can attain far more meaning if others also positively
value me (Sartre 1992: 282-4, 499-500). Now if I positively value their
freedom, instead of ignoring or oppressing it, it is more likely that they
will reciprocate with a favourable evaluation of mine. Another suggestion (and it is only that) that Sartre offers is that I particularly want
meaning and value given to me by those who freely choose to affirm
me. Recognitio n from a vassal or slave is not worth nearly as much as
authentic love freely bestowed. Thus I should will others' freedoms so
that the value and meaning they freely give to me and my life wiU be
favourable and wiU be from a source that I myself consider valuable.
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I personally think these are solid arguments but I must point out
that once again they require that one value logical consistency and
consistency with reality, the reality that all value and meaning come
from human freedoms. Simply put, Sartre's argument, even though
he doesn' t say so explicitly, appears to be that it is " inconsistent" for
me to desire a fully meaningful life and at the same time not value the
many freedoms which are the only sources of meaning and value for
my life. But, to repeat my earlier objection, consistency itself possesses
no intrinsic or objective value in the early Sartre's ontology. Furthermore, it still remains vague just what it means in the practical order
to value the freedom of others. Surely I am not to value the freedom
of everyone (including Hitler and Stalin) and support whatever goals
they freely choose.
As for the second ethics, although neither in the Rome lecture nor
any other later work does Sartre explicitly construct an argument to
demonstrate that we should seek the fulfilment of others, not just of
ourselves, the notion of human interdependency remains central to
his thought. In rus last major work, The Family Idiot, which he says
contains "concrete morality", he emphasizes the needs human beings
have for each other, in particular their needs for love.
If an infant is loved by his mother, Sartre generalizes from his study
of Gustave Flaubert, he experiences hjmself to be of value and becomes
valuable to himself. "The first interest he [the infant] attaches to his
person is derived from the care whose object he is", Sartre writes; " If
the mother loves him, in other words, he gradually discovers rus beingan-object as his being-loved . . . [and] he becomes a value in his own
eyes" (Sartre 1987: 129, n. 2).
Even a human being's awareness that he or she is a free agent capable
of acting on the world to fulfil his or her needs is totally dependent on
others, Sartre says. We also need the love of others to assure us that
we have something worth doing, a mission in life, a reason for being:
"Briefly, the love of the Other is the foundation and guarantee of the
objectivity of the individual's value and his mission" (ibid.: 135). More
than any other work of his, The Family Idiot describes in great detail the
overwhelming need human beings have to be valued and loved by others
and thus their complete dependence on each other to achieve human
fulfilment. And in no other work did Sartre push human dependency
and conditioning so deep, into infancy. In its own way his last major
work demonstrates the need to liberate human beings &om human
relationships and structures that prevent them from becoming fully
human- beginning in infancy. Towards the end of his study of Flaubert,
Sartre refers to what he calls "true humanism" which he says involves
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human beings working together to "in stitute a new order that is proper
to man". "True humanism", which is a pparently the morality of the
second ethics, "should take these [needs] as its starting point and never
deviate from them" (Sartre 1991a: 263~). Such humanism, he states,
can o nly be built upon o ur mutual recognition of our commo n human
needs and our common "right" to their satisfaction (Sartre 1987: 413).

Conclusion
I have tried to set forth the characteristics of Sartre's second (dialectical) ethics by contrasting it with his first attempt at ethics. I have
argued that Sartre is correct in believing that the second ethics makes
significant improvements over the first. Its goal- humans with needs
fulfilled- contains far more content than the freedom of all of the first.
Also, by rooting human values in human needs it provides them with
a mo re objective character and so overcomes the radically subjective
nature that values have in the first. The second ethics also provides a
much more solid justification for making human fulfilment its primary
value and goaJ by rooting all values in human needs. The fi rst ethics
cannot ultimately justify making the freedom of all (or anything else)
its primary val ue. Finally by its deep account of the human need for
love, the second ethics offers a greater understanding of the thorough
dependence of human beings on each o ther and, consequently, their
need to seek the fulfilment of the needs of all.
In one of his last interviews, he expressed himself especially forcefully on this point. We must create a society, he states, "in which we can
live for others and for o urselves", which requires that we " try to learn
that one can onl y seek his being, his life, in living for others" (Anderson
1993 : 172). "In that lies the truth", he adds, " there is no other" (ibid.).
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